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MEN OF THE SPEAR AND MEN OF GOD: ISLAMISM’S
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NEW SOMALI STATE
INTRODUCTION
In September 2012, Somalia’s new government held a presidential election
for the first time—Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, an Islamist, won.1 Twenty years
after a coalition of clans overthrew military dictator Mohamed Siyaad Barre
and the country fell into anarchy,2 a new state is beginning to take shape.
Though the government has yet to pass very many laws, Somalia’s new
Constitution establishes parliamentary democracy,3 declares Islam the official
religion,4 considers human rights a guiding principle,5 and guarantees private
freedom of religion while restricting the public propagation of religions other
than Islam.6 The state is still far from secure, and the government has yet to

1 Somali Election of Hassan Sheikh a ‘Great Step’, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-19557884 (last updated Sept. 11, 2012, 6:53 AM) (noting responses to the election of Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud).
2 Somalia Profile, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503 (last updated Oct. 24,
2012, 9:31 AM).
3 See DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, ch. 4 (Somalia); id. art. 64(1) (“The members of the House of
the People of the Federal Parliament shall be elected by the citizens of the Federal Republic of Somalia in a
direct, secret and free ballot.”); id. art. 72 (“The members of the Upper House of the Federal Parliament shall
be elected through a direct, secret and free ballot by the people of the Federal Member States . . . .”); id. art.
89(1) (“The Houses of the Federal Parliament shall elect the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia in a
joint session . . . .”). The elections that brought the current government to power were not formal enough to
implement universal franchise. See Somalia’s New President: Can He Really Rescue the Place?, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 15, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21562988 (“[President] Hassan was . . . chosen . . . by a
newly established 275-member parliament that was in turn handpicked a month ago by a conclave of clan
elders. In a first round of voting, in which twenty-two candidates competed, Mr. Hassan came second to the
incumbent, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, but prevailed over him easily with 190 votes to 79 in a run-off.”).
4 DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, art. 2(1) (Somalia) (“Islam is the religion of the State.”); id.
art. 2 (3) (“No law which is not compliant with the general principles and objectives of Shari’ah can be
enacted.); id. art. 30(8) (“The teaching of Islam shall be compulsory for pupils in both public and private
schools,” except those owned by non-Muslims).
5 Id. arts. 15(2), 16, 26 (prohibiting arbitrary detention while promising freedom of association and the
right to property).
6 Id. art. 17(1) (“Every person is free to practice his or her religion.”); id. art. 11(3) (prohibiting
discrimination on religious grounds); id. art. 2(2) (“No religion other than Islam can be propagated in the
country.”).
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extend its authority everywhere,7 but Somalia is taking its first steps toward
stable government.
Acceptance of Islamists is one significant advantage of the new state
compared to earlier transitional governments. Islamists seek to identify and
promote “Islamic values” in law, politics, and society through peaceful
political participation, armed revolution, and community development.8
Islamists are important in Somalia, and they are controversial. The electoral
vindication of their efforts to enter democracy is encouraging. After several
years of antagonism between Islamists on one side and transitional politicians
and their supporters on the other, it is time to recognize that Somali Islamism is
more than just extremism. Islamism can offer the state much-needed
legitimacy, is likely to reconcile itself to democracy, and has a valuable focus
on community development. Islamists can be a positive force for Somalia’s
future.
Islamists have been highly active in Somalia for the past four decades. In
the 1970s and 1980s, they rose to prominence by opposing the regime of
Mohamed Siyaad Barre.9 Barre took power in a 1969 coup and unsuccessfully
tried to co-opt religion into his brand of “Islamic socialism” while opposing
independent-minded religious leaders.10 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, after
Barre’s fall, Islamists created courts and militias in an effort to restore order.
The most prominent of these court-militia organizations banded together as the
Union of Islamic Courts (“UIC”),11 which earned popular respect by restoring
order to much of the country before being driven out by a 2006 Americanbacked Ethiopian invasion.12

7 See, e.g., U.N. News Ctr., Somalia: Welcoming Recent Gains, UN Envoy Says Consolidating Peace
Still ‘Not Easy’ (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43863&Cr=somalia&Cr1=
#.UOYQO3fW5Hk; Hassan Sheikh Mohamud: Somalia’s New President Profiled, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19556383 (featuring a map illustrating who controls which
regions of Somalia).
8 See discussion infra Part I (considering definitions of “Islamist”).
9 See AHMED SAMATAR, SOCIALIST SOMALIA: RHETORIC AND REALITY 108–10 (1988); see also
discussion infra Part I.A.1.
10 See Hussein M. Adam, Islam and Politics in Somalia, 6 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 189, 204–05 (1995);
SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 108–10; see also discussion infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
11 See discussion infra Part I.A.2, for more on the UIC.
12 See Bill Roggio, The Rise & Fall of Somalia’s Islamic Courts: An Online History, LONG WAR J., Jan.
4, 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_rise_fall_of_som.php.
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After the invasion, some former UIC members joined groups that were
much more radical than the UIC had been.13 These groups are considered
menaces by many Somalis and foreign observers.14 The most notorious of
these groups, al-Shabaab, continues its war to establish regional theocracy.15
But many Somali Islamists do not embrace al-Shabaab’s extremism. Instead,
they have earned respect for their resistance to Barre, efforts at making life
better during anarchy, and prominence in community organizing and
development.
Many Islamists are willing to take their place in a new regime that respects
the rule of law and allows for free political deliberation. The state is right to
give Islamists the opportunity to participate, an opportunity that earlier
transitional politicians refused them. Islamists have many contributions to offer
the state, many benefits to gain from political participation, and many reasons
to continue to work peacefully for community development.
This Comment analyzes benefits that can arise from mutual cooperation
between the new state and Islamists to rebut anti-Islamist attitudes on the part
of transitional politicians and their foreign supporters. This Comment also
argues that Islamists who have not committed their support to democracy
ought to do so, for pragmatic and principled reasons. Finally, this Comment
identifies issues related to political participation that Islamists still need to
address. Each of these arguments is meant to expand consideration of Somali
Islamism beyond extremism. Part I of this Comment introduces Somali
Islamism’s tendencies, history, and attitudes toward democracy. Part II
describes the most disturbing tendency in Somali Islamism—extremism—and
the hostility it has inspired in recent years. Part III considers what benefits
Islamists can offer the state as political participants. Part IV discusses the
incentives that Islamists who have yet to commit to democracy have for doing
so. Part V highlights areas in which Islamist political agendas need further
development.

13

See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 25 (2010) (“In February 2008, then
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist.”); see discussion infra Part II.A–B.1.
14 See id.
15 See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
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I. SOMALI ISLAMISM IS IMPORTANT, AND MANY ISLAMISTS ARE WILLING TO
ACCEPT DEMOCRACY
“Islamism” is a contested term with three primary persuasions.16 First, the
term can refer to a religious revivalist effort that views a return to authentic
Islamic values and practices as the answer to modern social problems,
including poverty and the failures of nationalism.17 Second, “Islamism” can
mean militancy aiming to consolidate political power and impose Islamic law
on a country.18 Third, and most broadly, the term can signify a variety of
political ideologies professing Islam as their source of inspiration in principles
and policy prescriptions.19
This Comment incorporates all three of these meanings by using
“Islamism” to refer broadly to those movements and actors that believe in
infusing law, politics, and society with Islamic values. Somali Islamists, in
particular, have a long history of taking multiple approaches to political
systems, including democracy. Their experiences and beliefs that make them
potent partners of the new state.
16 See Abdurahman Moallim Abdullahi, The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Historical Evolution With
a Case Study of the Islah Movement (1950–2000), at 24 (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill
University), available at http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/-?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=103487&silo_
library=GEN01 [hereinafter Abdullahi Dissertation]. Abdullahi was a 2012 presidential candidate and is the
“director of political office” for the Somali Muslim Brotherhood (al-Islah). Mohamed Odowa, Platform of a
Presidential Candidate, SOMALIA REPORT (July 21, 2012), http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/
3522/Platform_of_a_Presidential_Candidate. Abdullahi’s dissertation, though unpublished, provides a unique
insight into Somali Islamism from one of its leading political figures.
17 See Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 34–35, 144, 213 (discussing the collapse of pan-Arab
nationalism, and anti-poverty efforts by Somali Islamists). This meaning is commonly used with regards to
Wahhabism, a movement that has transformed Saudi political and religious life by stressing alleged
fundamental beliefs over mere customs. See generally DAVID COMMINS, THE WAHHABI MISSION AND SAUDI
ARABIA (2006). Saudi Arabia seeks to spread Wahhabism to other Muslim-majority countries. Id.
18 A prime recent example is the attempted uprising by Malian Islamists in 2012. See Mali Tuareg and
Islamist Rebels Agree on Islamist State, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18224004 (last
updated May 27, 2012). The uprising was defeated by French military intervention. Mali and Tuareg Rebels
Sign Peace Deal, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22961519 (last updated June 18,
2013).
19 See Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 24. This meaning can apply to groups ranging the
spectrum from staunch supporters of democracy to firm believers in theocracy. See, e.g., Justice and
Development Party (Turkey), BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE, & WORLD AFFAIRS, http://berkleycenter.
georgetown.edu/resources/organizations/justice-and-development-party-turkey (last visited Feb. 4, 2013)
(describing Turkey’s governing Islamists, who support that country’s democratic regime); Rahimullah
Yusufzai, A Who’s Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, Part One—North and
South Waziristan, 6 TERRORISM MONITOR (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/
?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5169&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1#.UtgCeaVMY_4
(discussing the Pakistani Taliban, a theocratic terrorist group).
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A. Somali Islamism Has a Long History and Is Highly Active
Islamism emerged as a major force in Somali politics in the 1970s and
1980s by challenging the Barre regime’s hypocrisy and violence. Once the
government fell, Islamists worked to restore order to the country. In addition to
their formal political activities, Islamists have undertaken various “community
commitments,” providing essential services and social organization. These
activities all helped Islamists gain legitimacy and firsthand knowledge that
they can contribute to the new state.
1. Muslims Organized in the Colonial Era and Islamists Resisted the Barre
Regime
Somali Islamism first rose out of indigenous Sufism,20 a variety of Islam
that focuses on spiritual perfection through the observance of traditional
practices. Sufi Muslims have been politically active in Somalia for over a
century. During the colonial era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, religious leaders worked to forge nationalist movements.21 They
sought to unite Somali Muslims in an independent nation.22 Sufis continue this
legacy of political activity: They recently organized a militia to resist alShabaab and bolster the new state.23 Modern Somali Islamism, though, is not
monolithically Sufi.24 An influx of Islamist fundamentalism inspired by
Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and Afghan Islamism has supplemented indigenous
Sufi Islamism.25
Due to Barre’s hostility to all Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s, Sufi and
non-Sufi Islamists came to share a common struggle. Barre used Islamic
20

See SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 25.
See IOAN M. LEWIS, SAINTS AND SOMALIS: POPULAR ISLAM IN A CLAN-BASED SOCIETY 68 (1998).
Somalia was occupied by the Italians, the French, and the British. David E. Kromm, Irredentism in Africa: The
Somali-Kenya Boundary Dispute, 70 TRANSACTIONS KAN. ACAD. SCI. 359, 360 (1967).
22 LEWIS, supra note 21, at 69.
23 See Andrew Harding, Meeting Somalia’s al-Shabab, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2009, 4:41 PM), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8133127.stm (explaining the rise of the Sufi militia Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jamma’a); Somalis
March Against Islamists, AL JAZEERA (June 23, 2006, 5:58 pm), http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/06/
20084912551665235.html (describing a rally of 700 Somalis against al-Shabaab organized by Ahlu Sunnah
Wal-Jammaa).
24 See AFYARE ABDI ELMI, UNDERSTANDING THE SOMALI CONFLAGRATION: IDENTITY, POLITICAL ISLAM
AND PEACEBUILDING 56–57 (2010) (accounting for the rise of four of the largest Islamist tendencies in
Somalia).
25 Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 28. Fundamentalists often consider Sufism to be one of the
mere customs that should be pressed out in favor of “authentic” practices and values. See discussion supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
21
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rhetoric and touted the religious values of his regime in the early years
following his takeover in 1969.26 But this rhetoric masked the brutality Barre
used against Muslims who dissented from his vision of Islamic socialism. For
instance, he made “us[ing] religion to create division or to cripple or weaken
the authority of the leaders” a capital offense.27 Barre insisted on Islam’s
centrality in Somali society, but forced independent religious leaders to stay
clear of politics.28
They refused. Religious leaders protested a law Barre proposed that would
have granted women more rights in divorce and inheritance.29 The regime
argued that Shari′a family law condoned women’s oppression.30 Clerics
responded by accusing Barre of interfering with Somali religious life, and by
condemning secularism and bureaucracy.31 This charged opposition both the
Barre regime and secular-style women’s rights—it was not a watershed
moment in the relationship between Islamists and human rights theory.32 But
Barre’s response was swift and bloody: He executed ten theologians for
“seditious and counter-revolutionary activities.”33
In the wake of the crackdown, Somalis increasingly attended mosques,
worshipped communally at shrines, and joined cooperative Islamic agricultural
communities.34 Underground Islamist groups recruited new members and
organized at the grassroots level, supporting women expelled from universities
for wearing Islamic garb and hosting Qur’anic study circles for students.35
Some took up arms, while others opted for peaceful protest.36 The Barre
26 See SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 108–09 (citing MAXAMED SIYAAD BARRE, MY COUNTRY AND MY
PEOPLE: SELECTED SPEECHES OF JAALLE SIYAD 94, 181 (1979)) (“Ours is the religion of common man. It
stands for equality and justice. . . . If both Islam and Socialism advocate justice, equality and improvement of
people’s lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one another?”). One SomaliAmerican scholar reports that “deep down [Barre] did not really believe in any religion.” Adam, supra note 10,
at 209 n.37.
27 AFRICA WATCH REPORT, A GOVERNMENT AT WAR WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE: SOMALIA 20 (1990)
(quoting Law for Safeguarding Nat’l Sec. No. 54, art. 12 of 1970 (Somalia)).
28 Adam, supra note 10, at 204.
29 SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 109.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See discussion infra Part IV, for reasons why Somali Islamism and human rights can be compatible.
33 SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 109.
34 See Adam, supra note 10, at 210. One such cooperative was comprised of “about 150 celibate men
[living] under a religious sheikh,” growing a variety of crops. Id. at 212.
35 Abdurahman Moallim Abdullahi, Recovering the Somali State: The Islamic Factor, in SOMALIA:
DIASPORA AND STATE RECONSTRUCTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 196, 209 (Abdulkadir O. Farah et al., eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Recovering]; Adam, supra note 10, at 214.
36 Abdullahi, supra note 35, at 271.
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regime spent the 1980s and 1990 trying to maintain control by suppressing
Islamism.37 Islamists protested and Barre again employed violence, this time
killing more than a thousand people.38 In 1991, a coalition of clan leaders—
whose role has long been important in Somali society—overthrew the Barre
regime.39 No government consolidated power in the years that followed.40
After decades of struggle, Islamists had earned the respect of many
Somalis. They proved an alternative to the hypocritical, tyrannical government
and resisted Barre without becoming corrupt. This reputation will prove a
valuable resource for the new state.
2. Islamists Tried to Restore Order After Barre’s Fall
When the Barre regime was overthrown, Islamism emerged as an important
political identity in Somalia. Different Islamist groups set out to bring order to
chaos, turning their institutions and networks into forces for stability.
The first post-Barre effort by Islamists failed. After the government fell in
the spring of 1991, a band of Islamists led by a local hotel owner organized a
militia in Mogadishu, the nation’s capital.41 They tried to enforce strict sexual
mores, but this proved too difficult thanks to the unruly “gun-toting youth”
brought in by clan militias.42 Realizing that they had overreached, the Islamists
retreated to a Mogadishu district they idealistically dubbed “Medina” in honor
of the Arabian city where Mohammed and his followers created the first
Islamic political community.43
Later efforts were more successful. Islamists, especially those affiliated
with the UIC, opened courts and mustered militias throughout the 1990s,
focusing on broad law enforcement and not just sexual purity. Many Somalis
saw this work as a genuine, apolitical effort to stop chaos and crime.44 The
37 Adam, supra note 10, at 214 (recounting that Islamic leaders in Mogadishu were arrested, accused of
destabilizing the government, and sentenced to death after the murder of Salvatore Colombo, the Catholic
bishop of Mogadishu).
38 Id. at 214–15.
39 See Siad Barre’s Fall Blamed for Somalia’s Collapse into Civil War, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.voanews.com/content/siad-barre-fall-led-into-civil-war-020111-115008454/134345.html.
40 See id.
41 Adam, supra note 10, at 216.
42 Id.
43 Id.; The Prophet Muhammad and the Origins of Islam, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.
metmuseum.org/learn/for-educators/publications-for-educators/art-of-the-islamic-world/unit-one/the-prophetmuhammad-and-the-origins-of-islam (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
44 See Ken Menkhaus, Political Islam in Somalia, 9 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 109, 111–13 (2002).
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militias arrested and detained violent criminals.45 They also took control of
central Mogadishu’s main market.46 Some of the more radical Islamists applied
amputation as a Shari′a punishment, treated women poorly and forced them to
veil, and committed other human rights violations.47 But even they, along with
their more moderate comrades, were regarded as less corrupt and prone to
bribery than clan militias.48
The UIC brought peace to Mogadishu and gained popular approval by
“organizing street cleanups, visiting hospitals, overseeing a mini building
boom and recruiting elderly policemen to don faded uniforms” for the first
time in years.49 They earned good will through their efforts to restore law and
order. As one Mogadishu resident said, “[i]t’s an exchange . . . . They brought
us peace, we give them work.”50 As political leaders, Islamist rapport with the
people will prove highly valuable.
3. Somali Islamists Undertook Community Commitments
Somali Islamists have undertaken “community commitments” beyond
providing law and order. These broad efforts to “Islamize” Somalia do not
involve competing for control of state institutions. Nonetheless, they have
helped cement the place of Islamism in Somali society and are a great political
asset for Islamists.
Sufism has traditional precedents for community commitments.51 Most
Somali Muslims belong to Sufi congregations or communities [tariiqas], each
of which has its own doctrines and practices.52 Tariiqas are one of Somali
social life’s foundations. Some Somalis, for example, live in agricultural
communes organized by tariiqas,53 an option that became increasingly popular

45 Lara Santoro, Islamic Clerics Combat Lawlessness in Somalia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR July 13,
1999, at 8.
46 See id. at 1.
47 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 112–13.
48 See id.
49 Jeffrey Gettleman, Islamists Calm Somali Capital with Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at A1.
50 Id.
51 LEWIS, supra note 21, at 8–9.
52 Id. at 9.
53 Id. at 13; see also Adam, supra note 26, at 212 (describing in one such commune, “about 150 celibate
men [lived] under a religious sheikh growing various crops: cabbages, tomatoes, onions, papayas, carrots, and
watermelons. They were also experimenting with specimens of spices and lemons.”).
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as dissatisfaction with the Barre regime grew.54 Tariiqas are important
providers of charity, missionaries, and education for customary religious
leaders.55 Tariiqa-trained leaders then serve as judges and administer their
interpretations of Shari′a in marriage, property, commerce, and tort disputes.56
The Sufi tradition exists alongside other Islamist tendencies that do not
have networks of tariiqas and customary religious leaders. Some of these
Islamists established courts with stricter interpretations of Shari′a than the
customary leaders provide.57 Others organized in the universities.58 The Somali
Muslim Brotherhood (“al-Islah”), one of the largest non-Sufi organizations,
operates medical programs and Arabic-language schools,59 provides
humanitarian assistance to northern Somalia,60 invests in commercial
ventures,61 and organizes peace conferences.62 Sufi Islamists can draw on
traditional community ties and local authorities, but non-Sufi Islamists also
have community commitments.
Somali Islamists have spent the past four decades resisting the government,
trying to build new public institutions, and becoming part of community life.
These experiences will prove valuable to Islamists in the new state as they seek
to establish public social services for the first time in twenty years. Their skills
will help develop the country and its democracy.
B. Many Somali Islamists Accept Democracy
Many Somali Islamists profess positive attitudes toward democracy: some
believe in it very strongly, while others are more pragmatic and will work with
the new state as long as they think they can advance an Islamist agenda. This
pragmatism holds the possibility of peace and political pluralism. Even if one
would rather see principled commitment to democracy from pragmatists,
democratic politics provide incentives that should make the new state attractive
to them, both immediately and in the long run.
54 See Adam, supra note 10, at 210 (“In response to social and economic insecurities [in the 1970s and
1980s], the Islamic reaction adopted various manifestations . . . [including] enhanced activities among
relatively self-reliant Islamic agropastoral co-operatives.”).
55 See LEWIS, supra note 21, at 13.
56 Id. For elaboration on religious leaders and law, see id. at 63–64,.
57 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 112–13.
58 See Adam, supra note 10, at 214.
59 Abdullahi, supra note 35, at 287–89.
60 See id. at 240.
61 Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 115.
62 Abdullahi, supra note 35, at 283–85.
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1. Prominent Islamist Groups Embrace Democracy
Three prominent Islamist groupings—leaders associated with the Islamic
Call manifesto, the Somali National Movement (“SNM”), and al-Islah—have
historically supported and practiced democracy. Late in 1990, sixty-seven
prominent Islamic scholars issued a manifesto entitled Islamic Call.63 The
document called for nonviolent dialogue to end conflict with the Barre regime
and blamed both secular nationalism and the post-colonial parliamentary
system that Barre overthrew for Somalia’s plight.64 Though it critiqued
Somalia’s first experiment with representative statehood, Islamic Call endorsed
parliamentary democracy while rejecting violence and authoritarian
theocracy.65
Islamic Call’s nonviolent approach failed when the clans overthrew Barre,
but other Islamists shared its democratic ideals. The Islamist SNM took power
in Somaliland, a region in northwestern Somalia,66 after Barre’s fall.67 Its
leaders established a stable democratic state.68 SNM first practiced democracy
internally, appeasing fundamentalist supporters by pledging support for Shari′a
and featuring the first verse of the Qur’an in Arabic on its flag.69 But the
fundamentalists do not have a monopoly on power in the state: a humanitarian
woman served as foreign minister70 and several parties contest elections.71
SNM established a deliberative democratic system that has thus far withstood
pressure from extremists.

63 Adam, supra note 10, at 214–15. In an email on January 21, 2013, Dr. Adam informed the author that
the sole copy of his and Mohamad Hassan Farah’s English translation of Islamic Call has been lost.
64 Id. at 199–200, 204, 215.
65 See id. at 215.
66 Somaliland, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORG., http://www.unpo.org/members/7916 (last
visited Feb. 20, 2013).
67 U.S. BUREAU CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., SOMALIA: SOMALI NATIONAL MOVEMENT FROM
ITS INCEPTION THROUGH THE PRESENT, Aug. 25, 1999, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6a6b5f.html.
68 Id.; Sar Medoff, Prospects for Islamic Democracy in Somalia, WARDHEER NEWS (Feb. 13, 2010),
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_10/Feb/13_prospects_sar.html.
69 Adam, supra note 10, at 217.
70 See Somaliland: Edna Adan Ismail Receives Legion d’Honneur From French President,
SOMALILANDPRESS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://somalilandpress.com/somaliland-edna-adan-ismail-receives-legiondhonneur-from-french-president-13247.
71 See Mohamed Cisman Dubadd, Somaliland’s Political Landscape and Overcome of Local Elections,
SOMALILANDPRESS (Apr. 18, 2010), http://somalilandpress.com/somaliland%E2%80%99s-political-landscapeand-overcome-of-local-elections.
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Al-Islah has a similar approach. Internally, it believes in “unity in
diversity,” accepting Muslims with different understandings of their religion
and its implications.72 Radical groups have condemned al-Islah for supporting
democracy and women’s participation in politics.73 As early as 1991, al-Islah
called for “restoration of the rule of law, releasing all political prisoners,
preparing an Islamic compliant constitution, adopting a multi-party system,
granting freedom of the press, and conducting a free election.”74 It first
considered forming a broad political party that would unite Somalis with
different political beliefs, then debated changing al-Islah itself into a political
party, ultimately deciding to allow members to choose which political
organizations to join and support.75
Al-Islah has three goals in the democratic process: (1) rebuilding the state;
(2) ensuring respect for “Islamic principles”; and (3) winning assembly seats.76
It believes Islam should remain the official religion, without other religions
being allowed to propagate themselves, and all laws must be compatible with
Shari′a.77 Al-Islah has not specified what “Islamist principles” and conformity
with Shari′a mean in terms of concrete policy, instead calling for “deepen[ing]
the right meaning of the Islamic concept of [democratic deliberation] and . . .
recogniz[ing] freedom as a human value incarnated in Allah’s dignification of
the human being.”78 This endorsement of democracy and silence as to what
Islamist policies would look like within the new State reflect the diverse views
and party allegiances of al-Islah’s members.79 It is a promising sign that alIslah is committed to the new state and is not determined to impose one narrow
72 Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 31, 213 (“[Al-Islah] openly advocates the advancement of the
rights of women and strongly supports their social and political participation in community affairs . . . . [It]
promotes women’s education in all its social development programs. The effect of these policies were so
resounding that Somali women now play important roles in politics and social life that were hitherto believed
to be in the domain of men.”).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 260 (citation omitted).
75 Id. at 273. Al-Islah deemed this solution to be the most practical given the relative lack of civil society
in Somalia. Id.
76 Id. at 284.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 214. This praise of freedom is in obvious tension with al-Islah’s opposition to the propagation of
religions other than Islam. One could argue that the fundamental importance of religious freedom should
foreclose any positive consideration of Somali Islamists. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.
18, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (protecting the right to manifest religion
in public). However, absolute refusal to engage with Islamists will only delay Somalia’s reconstruction further.
Positive engagement with Islamists, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for real dialogue on how Islamists can
balance their religious-political identity with their professed belief in freedom and human rights.
79 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
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understanding of Islamism. Al-Islah’s members translated that commitment
into practice when they competed for and won approximately ten percent of
the seats in a transitional government after a peace conference in 2000,80 and
when its political director, Dr. Abdurahman Abdullahi Baadiyow,
unsuccessfully competed for the presidency in 2012.81
2. Some Islamists are Pragmatic About Democracy
Many Somali Islamists have a more tepid stance toward democracy than
SNM and al-Islah. After so many years of chaos, few want to throw the
country into another conflict. But not all are committed to al-Islah’s belief that
democracy is the best way to honor God-given human dignity. Many are
simply willing to work with whatever system is in place, especially given that
many Somalis reject strict interpretations of Islam and are suspicious of
attempts to impose Islamism.
Somali Islam has historically been a “veil lightly worn”: women do not veil
unless they choose to, customary and civil law have often trumped Shari′a, and
the strict moral purity that the most radical Islamists demand has often been
seen as a foreign imposition.82 Many Somali Islamists want to reconcile their
political beliefs with the prevailing culture. As one Islamist woman said,
Islamist politics must be “properly and flexibly implemented.”83
Many Islamists would agree with one Islamist leader’s recent call “to
consider the existing socio-political realities and to push the clan-based
organization toward the desired Islamic society and Islamic state” without
seeking absolute power.84 Many Islamists are unsure of what to do with the
new state and have taken this approach, making strategic alliances with
businesspeople and militia leaders to foster community development without
committing to a political platform.85

80

Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 283–84.
See Odowa, supra note 16. In addition to the director, Abdullahi, and the successful candidate, Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud, two other prominent Islamists put forward strong showings in the election. Hassan M.
Abukar, Somalia’s New President: A Victory for Islamic Groups, WARDHEER NEWS (Sept. 11, 2012),
http://wardheernews.com/Articles_12/Sept/Abukar/11_Somalias_New_Presiden_A_Victory_for_Islamic_Gro
ups.html.
82 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 111.
83 See Adam, supra note 10, at 221.
84 Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 274. The introduction of the dissertation contains Abdullahi’s
credentials. See id. at ii.
85 Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 115–16.
81
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Pragmatic Islamists want to see Somalia transformed and oriented around
religious values. They will seek to preserve official recognition of Islam, and
perhaps advocate a greater role for Shari′a in state law than the new state
currently authorizes.86 Beyond those two goals, many are likely to accept
working within various government systems. Those pragmatic Islamists not yet
engaging the new state may in time be peacefully included in it.
Others, however, will abandon their pragmatism and join extremists,
believing only total power can Islamize Somalia. And some will prove never to
have been pragmatists at all, but only extremists biding time before seizing
power. Extremists cannot be accommodated within the new state unless they
fundamentally change their attitudes toward other political groups and reject
the use of terror.
II. EXTREMIST ISLAMISM IS PREVALENT, BUT OPPOSITION TO IT IS
OVERBOARD
Not all Islamists share SNM and al-Islah’s democratic credentials or follow
pragmatism. Some believe that their vision must be imposed through the use of
force. This approach is prevalent. The hostility it inspires, though, reaches too
far.
A. Extremist Islamism Is Prevalent
The history of militant Islamism in Somalia stretches back into the colonial
era, just like that of its more moderate counterparts. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, Mullah Mohamed ibn Abdullah Hassan tried to unite
Somalis against British imperialism under a hardline interpretation of Islam.87
Though he did not succeed in establishing an independent theocracy, Somalis
remember his extremism, absolute control of others, and violence against
fellow Somalis.88 He is commonly known as the “Mad Mullah.”89

86 See DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, art. 2(1). (Somalia). The author uses the word “perhaps”
because pragmatists are likelier to wait and see how the Shari a repugnancy clause functions before making
specific demands.
87 See SAADIA TOUVAL, SOMALI NATIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR UNITY IN
THE HORN OF AFRICA 53, 55–56 (1963).
88 See id. at 53, 56.
89 Id. at 51.
′
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Hassan was not the last Somali to use violence and authoritarianism to try
to impose Islamism. In the late 1990s, a number of Islamist militants returned
to Somalia after fighting against the Soviet Union’s failed invasion of
Afghanistan throughout the 1980s.90 They made up the most radical strand of
al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (“al-Ittihad”),91 one of the groups that tried to restore
order after Barre’s fall.92 They imposed draconian punishments—including
dismemberment—on criminals, prohibited consumption of the popular narcotic
qaat, and forced women to veil.93 Al-Ittihad collapsed in the early 2000s after
the United States linked several of its leaders to al-Qaeda and other global
terrorist organizations94 and several of its former officers rose to power in the
nascent UIC.95
Several of the most radical al-Ittihad commanders formed Harakat alShabaab al-Mujahideen (“al-Shabaab”), the “most powerful, dangerous and
far-reaching Al Qaeda affiliate.”96 Al-Shabaab seeks to unite ethnic-Somali
regions of East Africa, including parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, under a
theocracy.97 Following an internal power struggle, the group affiliated with
al-Qaeda and jihad against the West.98 It is ruthless, extorting religious alms,
caning a woman a hundred times for committing adultery, and arresting imams

90 LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., 7-5700 COUNTERING TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA: THE
U.S. RESPONSE 5 (2010). They fought alongside the Taliban. See id.
91 Id.
92 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 112
93 Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 112.
94 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, TERRORISM: WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. SANCTIONS 1–3 (freezing al-Ittihad’s assets); TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 33911, SOMALIA: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE 6 (2001).
95 The most prominent of these was Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. See Integrated Regional Information
Networks [IRIN], U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Somalia: Islamic Courts Set Up
Consultative Council, IRIN (June 26, 2006), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/59444/SOMALIA-Islamiccourts-set-up-consultative-council (reporting that the moderate but “controversial” al-Ittihad leader, Sheikh
Hassan Dahir Aweys named head of the UIC). Sheikh Aweys was among the first designated a terrorist
following 9/11. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
96 Tristan McConnell, Al Shabaab Branches Out Beyond Somalia, GLOBAL POST (Sept. 10, 2012, 5:00
PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120907/al-qaeda-al-shabaab-somalia; see also
PLOCH, supra note 90, at 6–7.
97 PLOCH, supra note 90, at 6.
98 Mahmoud Mohamed, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda Union Attempt to Raise Morale—Analysts, SABAHI (Feb.
13, 2012), http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/02/13/feature-01. Ironically, the
leader of the wing supporting an exclusively national struggle was Sheikh Aweys, long considered a supporter
of global terror by the American government. He was arrested by transitional government forces in June 2013
after the globalists gained the upper hand. Abdi Sheikh, Prominent Militant Arrested in Blow to Somali
Islamists, REUTERS (June 26, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/us-somalia-rebelsidUSBRE95P14F20130626.
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for using loudspeakers.99 Al-Shabaab fighters desecrated the bodies of foreign
soldiers, an atrocity even its al-Qaeda allies deemed “heinous and antiIslam[ic].”100 Since its recent military defeats at the hands of Kenyan and
African Union forces,101 al-Shabaab has adopted suicide bombings and other
forms of terrorism in resisting the government.102
This extremism has no future in the state, but it should not be taken as
representative of all Somali Islamism. Somali Islamic scholars recently issued
a fatwa against al-Shabaab, stating that its ideology is “a danger to the Islamic
religion and the existence of the Somali society.”103
B. Extremism Is Dangerous, but Its Opponents Target All Islamists
Al-Shabaab and other extremist Islamists give supporters of the new
Somali State reasons to fear them. Three reasons why are: (1) al-Shabaab’s
uncompromising rejection of democracy and its terrorist resistance campaign;
(2) the possibility that extremists will corrupt the new state, or build parallel
institutions keen on violence; and (3) the threat that Somali extremism poses to
99 Mahmoud Mohamed, Al-Shabaab Uses Zakat as Pretext to Extort Money from Somalis, SABAHI (Aug.
24, 2012), http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/08/24/feature-01; AK, AlShabaab Arrests Imams: Accused of Praying Too Loudly, SOMALIA REP. (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.
somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1437/Al-Shabaab_Arrests_Imams; Ismail Hassan Olad & Abdirashid Abdi,
Al-Shabaab Canes a Somali Woman Over Adultery: The Victim Received 100 Strokes of the Cane, SOMALIA
REPORT (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1770/AlShabaab_Canes_a_Somali_
Woman_Over_Adultery.
100 Dominic Wabala, East Africa: Al Qaeda Criticises Al Shabaab Over ‘Heinous and Anti-Islamic’
Activities, STAR (Sept. 7, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201209080109.html.
101 It is not clear why Kenya launched operations against al-Shabaab. See James Verini, The Last Stand of
Somalia’s Jihad: Can Kenya’s Invasion of Kismayo Put an End to al-Shabab for Good?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec.
17, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/17/the_last_stand_of_somalias_jihad (noting the
defeat of al-Shabaab in Kismayo and that some al-Shabaab fighters have withdrawn in order to regroup and
redirect their efforts); see also Julius Odeke, Al Shabaab Militants Disengage in Jowhar, INDEP. (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.independent.co.ug/news/news/7121-al-shabaab-militants-disengage-in-jowhar (defections from alShabaab to international pro-government forces).
102 See, e.g., Aidan Hartley, Cooking For Freedom: A London Chef Has Returned to Mogadishu to Make
a Stand Against al-Qa’eda, SPECTATOR, Nov. 24, 2012, at 20 (describing an earlier al-Shabaab suicide attack
on the same restaurant, where twenty people died); Somalia Blasts Hit Mogadishu’s Village Restaurant, BBC
NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24000782 (last updated Sept. 7, 2013, 1:34 PM) (describing a
car bomb and suicide bombing of a popular Mogadishu restaurant by al-Shabaab, in which fifteen people
died). It is also now targeting Kenyan civilians in retaliation for the campaign. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
103 Somali Islamic Scholars Denounce Al-Shabab in Fatwa, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-24057725 (last updated Sept. 11, 2013, 10:41 AM). The fatwa, or Islamic religious edict,
endorsed the new state as Islamic, forbade Muslims from supporting al-Shabaab, and obligated Muslims to
assist the state in suppressing the group. Id.
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other countries, given its increasingly global outlook and affiliations. However,
unfair and imprudent exclusion of all Islamists from the political process often
quickly results from hostility to extremism.
1. Extremism Is a Serious Threat
Extremism is a genuine existential threat to the new state and its adherents
are very unlikely to be reconciled to the political process. According to alShabaab’s leader, that group opposes democracy because “Allah says anyone
who follows a law that is . . . contrary to Allah’s law, has fully become an
unbeliever and left Allah’s religion.”104 Al-Shabaab greeted fellow Islamist
President Hassan’s election in September 2012 with three suicide bombings
targeting his life105 and considers government soldiers “apostates.”106 AlShabaab has proven an irreconcilable enemy, using venomous rhetoric against
the new State and targeting the lives of even its Islamist leaders.
Not all Islamist extremism is so eager to seek the spotlight. Extremists in
Somaliland, for instance, are quietly garnering power within the government:
They hold three cabinet seats and operate formally-registered political
organizations.107 Apparently, they are trying to “outmaneuver[] a civilian
government and indirectly control[] politics without ever claiming direct
control of the administration.”108 Other Islamists used the same strategy in
Puntland—a semi-autonomous region of Somalia that, like Somaliland, has
had a functional government for most of the past two decades—when they
took control of the Ministry of Justice against the protests of the region’s
president.109 While it is conceivable that these Islamists are trying to find a

104 Somalia: Al-Shabaab Leader Calls on Muslims to Fight Democracy, GAROWE ONLINE (June 25, 2010,
3:40 AM), http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Shabaab_leader_calls_on_
Muslims_to_fight_democracy.shtml.
105 See, e.g., Sudarsan Raghavan, Somalia’s New President Escapes Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2012
at A6. Al-Shabaab followed up that attack in late January 2013 with another unsuccessful suicide bomber who
killed several soldiers at the presidential palace. Abdi Sheikh, Suicide Bomber Kills Two Near Somali
Presidential Palace, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/ussomalia-conflict-idUSBRE90S08E20130129.
106 See Kenya Sends Troops to Attack al-Shabab, AL-JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/
2011/10/20111016115410991692.html (last updated Oct. 24, 2011, 6:48 AM)
107 See Abdi Hussein, Are Shabaab Subverting Politics in Somaliland?: Al-Shabaab Seen to Adopt
Guerilla Tactics and Political Subversion in Somaliland, SOMALIA REP. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.
somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3230/Are_Shabaab_Subverting_Politics_in_Somaliland.
108 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 116.
109 See id.

CAVEDON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

8/6/2014 9:21 AM

MEN OF THE SPEAR AND MEN OF GOD

489

way to engage with the state and not plotting a coup d’état,110 their activities
are suspicious.
Even some of the community commitments Islamists have undertaken
could be vulnerable to—or even fronts for—radicalization. Many Islamists
believe in transforming Somali society through education, welfare, and Arabiclanguage instruction.111 It becomes difficult to tell which Islamists are
apolitical culture-transformers and which have hidden agendas.112 The line
between al-Islah’s genuine efforts to build civil society and the nefarious
intentions of other groups is a thin one. What is to stop al-Shabaab and others
from building a parallel state, complete with propagandistic schools, draconian
courts, and violent militias, then using it to challenge the legitimate State’s
power and authority?
Somalis are not the only ones concerned about possible takeover or
circumvention of the State by extreme Islamists: Ethiopia, Kenya, and the
United States all have reasons to fear, too. Al-Shabaab wants control over
Somali-inhabited regions of neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya.113 The
governments of Ethiopia (which counts nearly as many Muslims as Christians
among its citizens)114 and Kenya (recently the site of a bloody, multiple-day
siege of a shopping mall by al-Shabaab fighters)115 have obvious reasons to
oppose the rise of Islamist theocracy in Somalia. The United States is
concerned because al-Shabaab has formally affiliated itself with al-Qaeda to
try to make Somalia a base for global terrorism.116 Al-Shabaab seems to have
taken particular joy in needling the American government: When the United
States placed bounties ranging from $3 to $7 million on the heads of alShabaab’s commanders, the group offered a reward of ten camels for anyone

110

See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing pragmatism and indeterminate Islamist attitudes toward democracy).
See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing community commitments).
112 Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 114.
113 PLOCH, supra note 90, at 6.
114 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ETHIOPIA:
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2005 (2005), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51472.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (“An estimated 40 to 45 percent of the population belongs to the Ethiopian
Orthodox Church (EOC); however, the EOC claims 50 percent of the country’s total population . . .
Approximately 45 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim, although many Muslims claim that the actual
percentage is higher.”).
115 Jason Straziuso et al., FBI Agents Inspect Kenya Mall Attack Site, Work To Establish Identities,
Nationalities of Attackers and Victims, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/fbi-kenya-mall-attack_n_3991526.html?ir=World. Approximately seventy
people were killed and another 175 wounded. Id.
116 MOHAMED, supra note 98.
111
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with information on “the hideout of the idiot [U.S. President Barack]
Obama.”117 Given its terrorist capabilities and connections, al-Shabaab could
turn from twisted satire to direct targeting of Americans.118
2. Opposition to Extremism Is Too Often Hostility to All Islamists
The beliefs and actions of extremist Islamist groups allow some Somali
politicians to reject any engagement with Islamists—even Islamists like alIslah and President Hassan who embrace democracy and are opposed by
extremists for their beliefs. Abdullahi Yusuf, president of the internationally
backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) from 2004 to 2008, did not
engage well with Somali intellectuals and clerics—he offended Islamists by
using the term “terrorist” when referring to many of them.119 The refusal of the
transitional government to foster good relations with Islamists denied it the
ability to root its policies in Somali culture.120 Abdullahi argues that this failure
stopped the TFG from “emphasis[ing] good governance under broad moral
principles, and laws divined by God” by appealing to Islamic principles of
“justice and fairness.”121 It also weakened the TFG’s democratic credentials.122
Cynicism suggests another reason for President Yusuf’s language: appeal
to foreign governments for support.123 Like President Yusuf, the American
government tends to conflate opposition to Islamism with anti-extremism. The

117 Somali Al-Shabab Camel Reward for Barack Obama ‘Absurd’, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-18394703 (last updated June 11, 2012).
118 It already recruits Somali-Americans and other Westerners. See Al Shabaab’s American Recruits,
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/al-shabaabs-american-recruits.pdf
(last updated Oct. 2013) (listing Americans recruited to fight for al-Shabaab in Somalia); see also Al-Amriki
and Al-Britani: Militants ‘Killed’ in Somalia, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24060558
(last updated Sept. 12, 2013) (announcing the deaths of two Westerners who had once fought for al-Shabaab,
killed by its fighters after siding with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys). See supra note 98 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Aweys’s power struggle.
119 ELMI, supra note 24, at 26.
120 See ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI A 25 (2008) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING].
121 Recovering, supra note 35, at 205.
122 Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 136 (“The free choice of the citizens through democratic
process [sic], as peaceful resolution of the conflict, is blocked by the secular elites with the support of the
western powers. . . .”). The most notorious recent case of anti-Islamism morphing into anti-democratic action
is the 2013 military coup against Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Ben
Wedeman et al., Coup Topples Egypt’s Morsy; Deposed President Under ‘House Arrest’, CNN (July 4, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests (reporting the coup, as well as a raid on the Cairo
offices of Al Jazeera, a leading international news agency).
123 See ELMI, supra note 24, at 26.
′
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United States deemed the entire UIC an al-Qaeda proxy,124 thereby confusing
domestic politics125 with international terrorism and failing to distinguish
between moderate and extremist tendencies. America was quick to back an
anti-UIC warlord army that, tellingly, branded itself the “Alliance for the
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.”126 Perhaps President Yusuf
hoped that calling his opponents terrorists would garner similar help.
Understandable fears still translate into excessive hostility to Somali
Islamists in peacemaking and nation-building, even as Islamists take power. A
regional newspaper accused four leading Islamist statesmen in the new
presidential administration of having “a common ideological base that is not
far removed from the al Shabaab radical Islamists.”127 Surely it is too much to
accuse President Hassan of appointing advisers sympathetic to the group that is
trying to kill him. But, this mentality of conflating Islamism with extremism
has predominated for the past twenty years. International peace conferences
carried on without any Islamists present.128 President Yusuf and the TFG
deemed Islamists terrorists and failed to establish good relations with the
moderates among them.129 The American government encouraged transitional
leaders in doing so.130
This mentality will not likely have a future. Somali Islamists are now at the
center of the new state and their leadership is essential to the process of
political reconstruction. Now, they will lead the charge to consolidate power
and suppress extremism. Other Somalis and foreigners will need to think about
the Islamists in new ways and develop nuance in assessing Islamism’s role in
Somali society and politics. This is especially true given the significant foreign
aid commitments the American government has made to the new state.131

124

See MARY HARPER, GETTING SOMALIA WRONG?: FAITH, WAR,

AND

HOPE

IN A

SHATTERED STATE 4

(2012).
125 See id. at 4; Gettleman, supra note 49, at 6 (quoting a UIC minister: “The world was so quick to label
us. . . All we are asking is to be judged on our deeds.”); see also supra Part I.A.2. for a discussion of the UIC.
126 See HARPER, supra note 124, at 361 (emphasis added).
127 President’s Inner Circle, INDIAN OCEAN NEWSL. (Afr. Intelligence, Paris, Fr.) Oct. 6, 2012.
ION/politics-power/2012/10/06/president-s-inner-circle,107917826-ART.
128 See, e.g., ELMI, supra note 25, at 26 (describing the exclusion of many Somali voices, including
Islamist ones, from the peace conference that produced TFG’s charter and explaining how that exclusion
harmed TFG’s legitimacy).
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA, MAY 7, 2013,
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209062.htm (“The U.S. Government hopes to continue
substantial financial support to Somalia in future years that will support Somalia’s progress and transition to
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Of course, foreign governments could choose another path. They could
recognize that their approach to Islamism and to Somali reconstruction has
been deeply flawed. Instead of becoming partners to the Islamists and other
political actors, they could choose disengagement. For many years, Western
governments have subsidized armed factions and intervention by neighboring
states rather than long-term development—a strategy that has delayed
stabilization.132 The resulting power vacuum has proven fertile ground for
terrorists, pirates, and war profiteers, each of whom threatens both Somali and
foreign interests.133 Behind the fog of this constant conflict, foreign
governments often lack the capacity to distinguish friends from foes.134
Foreign governments could prevent their past misjudgments of Somali
Islamism from continuing to delay reconstruction by limiting their concern
with Somali internal affairs.
However, they are unlikely to do so. The American government, in
particular, has committed to long-term military and intelligence involvement in
Somalia, and Kenya is responding to al-Shabaab’s devastating September 2013
terrorist attack on a Nairobi mall with continued military offensives.135 Given

longer-term development. U.S. foreign assistance programs support security, development and humanitarian
objectives. . . .”).
132 See Michael Shank, Why We Should Keep Out of Somalia’s Affairs, CNN BLOG: FAREED ZAKARIA:
GPS (Aug. 2, 2013, 11:46 AM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/02/why-we-should-keepout-of-somalias-affairs/ (“Still, the fact is that Somalia needs help building its institutions, developing
economically, and improving its legal and security infrastructure. In all the years that the West—America or
Britain—aided and abetted war efforts in Somalia, very little money, time or skill was spent on building
capacity in the country. Indeed, any capacity building was always undertaken primarily through an
interlocutor, be it the African Union, or worse, a neighboring country like Ethiopia or Kenya. This practice
must stop.”).
133 See Joseph Huff-Hannon, Piracy in Perspective: The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Foreign
Policy in Somalia, DISSENT (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/piracy-inperspective-the-unintended-consequences-of-u-s-foreign-policy-in-somalia (“[W]here there’s a vacuum and
opportunity for profit, fools rush in, and pirates and those who finance them have not been the only ones.
Private military contractors like Blackwater Worldwide are also eager to mine the proverbial gold that crisis,
lack of governance, and humanitarian strife have given birth to.”).
134 See Colum Lynch, Is the U.S. Ramping Up a Secret War in Somalia?, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 22, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/22/is_the_us_ramping_up_a_secret_war_in_somalia_al_shaba
b (“In a particularly grim twist, it is America’s counterterrorism partners—corrupt Somali institutions and
Kenyan collusion with al-Shabab’s financial backers—that pose a potentially even more lethal threat to
American aims.”).
135 See, e.g., id. (“The Obama administration earlier this year expanded its secret war in Somalia, stepping
up assistance for federal and regional Somali intelligence agencies that are allied against the country’s Islamist
insurgency.”); Office of the Spokesperson, supra note 131; Kenya Planes ‘Kill Somali Militants’ from alShabab, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25679777 (last updated Jan. 10, 2014, 4:05
AM) (“Kenya has several thousand troops in Somalia, fighting al-Shabab.”).
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the reality of continued foreign intervention, it is best for interested foreigners
not to see all Somali Islamists as threats.
Perhaps one of the reasons why all Islamism was brushed aside because of
fear of extremism for so long is under-appreciation of the benefits of mutual
engagement between Islamists and the Somali state. The remainder of this
Comment will strive to correct that by analyzing three pertinent aspects of
Islamism: contributions it offers the state, benefits it stands to gain from
political participation, and commitments it has made to Somali communities.
III. ISLAMISM CAN OFFER THE SOMALI STATE LEGITIMACY, VALUES, AND
IDENTITY
The Somali state will need security from extremists, as President Ahmed
and others realized. But, it must also have legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens,
values to guide its policies, and a shared identity to unite the nation. Islamism
offers each of these things.
A. Islamism Offers Legitimacy
Modern Western political philosophers routinely posit consent as the basis
of legitimate government.136 Behind consent, though, are the state’s “deep and
organic links with various non-state actors in the political field across society
at large.”137 People consent to a state that reflects their beliefs and affiliations,
one that interacts positively with the other communities with which they
associate.
Two things are “inviolable” in Somali culture: Islam and the clan.138
Somalis will not consent to the state unless it has deep and organic links with
the Islamism through which many Somalis interpret their religion. Islamism is
deeply intertwined with Somali social life, from civil society and educational
institutions to the economy.139 As explained in the preceding Parts of this

136 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT para. 119 at 45, reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Every Man being, as has been
shewed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any Earthly Power, but only his
own Consent . . . .”).
137 NEGOTIATING, supra note 119, at 92.
138 Recovering, supra note 34, at 196, 209. The Pew Forum estimates that 98.6 percent of Somalis are
Muslims; the vast majority of these are Sunnis. PEW RESEARCH RELIGION, & PUB. LIFE PROJECT, THE FUTURE
OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION (2001), available at http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population/.
139 Recovering, supra note 34, at 214.
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Comment, Somali Islamism has attained a high degree of popularity over the
past forty years by organizing against the Barre regime, proving an alternative
to the hypocritical, tyrannical government, and resisting without becoming
corrupt. It then helped to maintain law and order after Barre’s overthrow,
bringing peace to Mogadishu and Somaliland by establishing effective courts
and militias. Twenty years later, Islamists operate many community
institutions, providing basic social services such as education, famine relief,
and health care. And they provide Somalis with an identity that serves as an
alternative to the clan affiliation many view as discriminatory.
If the new state is going to mobilize citizens to rebuild and gain legitimacy
in their eyes, then its relationship with Islamism will be crucial.140 Islamists
have done much to ingrain themselves in Somali communities. Even aside
from the state’s moral imperative to earn legitimacy by respecting different
constituent groups, it is good that Islamists are helping to lead because they
have experience earning legitimacy as governors. Recall the Mogadishu
resident who, after Islamists pacified the city and restored social services, said:
“It’s an exchange . . . . They brought us peace, we give them work.”141 The
state will depend on a similar exchange with its citizens, seeking conformity
and contributions in exchange for peaceful order. What better way to forge this
relationship than through collaboration with Islamists who have been forging it
with Somalis for the past twenty years? Indeed, one of President Hassan’s
greatest strengths is that he is “completely networked into the strongest and
best bits of Somali society” through his Islamist affiliations.142
B. Islamism Offers Values
Every state needs values, both as a benchmark against which to measure
political performance and as a substantive basis for law. Somalia’s provisional
constitution recognizes this, privileging human rights and Shari′a as sources of
values.143 Islamists should have an important role in helping the state craft laws
based on these norms.
140 CARRIE ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
EGYPT 7–8 (2002) (explaining how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could serve as a catalyst for political
action).
141 Gettleman, supra note 49, at A6.
142 Somalia’s New President, supra note 3.
143 DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, arts. 2(3), 39–40 (Somalia) (establishing repugnancy clause
forbidding laws contrary to Shari a, means of redress for violations of human rights, and the manner in which
human rights are recognized under law).
′
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1. Islamists Can Hold the State Accountable to Transcendent Moral Norms
Religion is a source of transcendent moral norms: It provides principles and
final goals that orient the life of both people and societies.144 Religious norms
can drive policy and call government decisions that threaten the common good
into question. Islamists believe that their religion has much to offer political
society in this vein. The slogan of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood expresses the
Islamist attitude toward social and political problems: “Islam is the
solution.”145
Somali Islamists seek to honor this conviction by monitoring state
performance against higher norms of justice, fairness, and empowerment.
Abdullahi describes this task as one of the strongest points in favor of Islamist
political participation: “[Islamic law supports] justice and fairness[,] prohibits
cheating, exploitation, fraud, deception as well as coercive policies . . . [and]
emphasizes good governance under broad moral principles, and laws divined
by God.”146 He believes that these divine laws include restricting the public
propagation of religions other than Islam and adopting visible symbols of the
state’s affiliation with that religion.147 But al-Islah has also demanded multiparty democracy, freedom of the press, and free elections since the Barre
era.148 And Abdullahi acknowledges that its robust endorsement of women’s
education and participation in politics is “striking and pioneering among
Islamic movements and traditional societies.”149 On the whole, al-Islah’s
Islamism is not a diehard effort to implement a rigid understanding of Shari′a.
It is a locus for deliberation about how Islamist principles can inform modern
development.150 This kind of Islamism has the potential to serve Somali
democracy by demanding that the state respect the rights and morals of its
citizens and prioritize democratic deliberation.151
This role for Islamism as a source of moral guidance will conform to
Somali notions of public religion better than antagonizing Islamists and
keeping them away from politics, as President Yusuf and his international
144

SAMATAR, supra note 9, at 37 (quoting GUENTER LEWY, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION (1974)).
See Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, BBC NEWS (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-middle-east-13113405 (noting that the slogan has been adopted by Islamists worldwide).
146 Recovering, supra note 34, at 205.
147 See Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 284.
148 Id. at 260.
149 Id. at 213.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 214.
145
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supporters did. Without embracing essentialism, it is fair to say that most
Muslims, and certainly Somalia’s many Islamists, believe Islam concerns both
personal and community life, including politics.152 Somalis look to religion as
a source of transcendent moral norms in questions of government, society, and
economics, as do other Muslims throughout the world.153 As the new
constitution recognizes in contrast to the approach often taken by the TFG,
there is little sense in trying to inoculate politics to Islam for the sake of
preventing infection with extremism.
2. Islamism Can Provide Ethical Content for the Law
In addition to providing transcendent moral norms, Islam has a juridical
tradition, Shari′a, that the new state’s provisional constitution recognizes as a
fundamental source of law.154 Interpretations of Shari′a, including Islamist
ones, will shape how the new state understands its laws and values. The state
will benefit from the experience Islamists gained in administering courts,
enforcing laws, and interpreting Shari′a.
Not all of the Islamist experience in interpreting and applying Shari′a is
worthy of emulation. The first instinct of Islamists after Barre’s fall was to
crack down on promiscuity and what they deemed public expressions of
sexuality in Mogadishu—an effort that clan militia members rejected because
of their own abuses,155 and that many Somalis saw as a foreign imposition,
given that women have not customarily been forced to veil.156 This draconian
tendency continues to guide some Islamists to absurd prohibitions.157 It has led
others to use unacceptably harsh punishments, including dismemberment, for a

152 Recovering, supra note 35, at 210; see also NEGOTIATING, supra note 120, at 85 (“Believers will
always assert their religious convictions politically, and it is better to acknowledge and regulate this reality
than to deny it and force such political expression of religious beliefs to go underground.”). This mentality is
certainly not limited to Muslims, as the American Christian Right, Europe’s Christian Democratic political
parties, Israel’s Orthodox Jewish ones, India’s Hindu nationalists, and other manifestations of “public religion”
show.
153 Recovering, supra note 35, at 210.
154 DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, art. 2(3) (“No law which is not compliant with the general
principles and objectives of Shari’ah can be enacted.”).
155 Adam, supra note 10, at 216.
156 See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 111.
157 See Njoki Ndungâu, Bra Ban in Somalia Is the Apex of Zealotry Nonsense, STANDARD DIGITAL (Oct.
24, 2009), http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?id=1144026892&cid=491&articleID=1144026892 (describing a
ban on brassieres instituted by Al-Shabaab).

CAVEDON GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

8/6/2014 9:21 AM

MEN OF THE SPEAR AND MEN OF GOD

497

variety of crimes.158 The state cannot reconcile Shari′a and human rights by
countenancing the oppression of women or the use of bodily mutilation.
They do not need to do so to accommodate most Islamists. When the UIC
seized control of Mogadishu from warlords in 2006, they did not enforce a
harsh moral vision.159 Their militiamen allowed soccer games, planned for
democratic elections, reopened movie theaters, educated girls in schools, and
even permitted commercial activity in front of their headquarters during noon
prayers.160 Their law-enforcement efforts focused on arresting and detaining
violent criminals.161 Islamists used tolerance—even though the UIC
commanded a victorious militia, held the admiration and gratitude of the
populace,162 and was politically dominant.163 Somalia’s Islamists are, for the
most part, less concerned with dogmatic strictures than with maintaining
popular legitimacy and peacefully changing their culture.
In places outside Mogadishu, Islamists have also proven adept
administrators and enforcers of the law. Customary Sufi religious leaders have
long been judges for local communities, interpreting Shari′a to settle various
disputes.164 Other Islamists opened courts to fill something of the vacuum left
by the dissolution of the Barre regime: These were often legitimate efforts to
establish local order with no overarching political agenda.165 Islamists were
respected for their discipline, especially given the prevalence of corruption
among clan militiamen.166 Islamists worked for order when no one else could,
and they should be encouraged to use that experience to help rebuild Somalia’s
judicial and legal institutions.
In Somali democracy, Islamists will also have the right and duty to
influence the state’s interpretation of Shari′a and crafting of legislation. Islam
provides ethical principles that Muslims believe ought to guide political life.
158

See Menkhaus, supra note 44, at 112–13 (discussing areas controlled by al-Ittihad).
Gettleman, supra note 49, at A1.
160 Id. at A6. That these tolerant militiamen were the first to call themselves al-Shabaab shows just how
much the Ethiopian offensive against the UIC and its ensuing collapse contributed to radicalization. Id.; see
also discussion supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
161 Santoro, supra note 45, at 8.
162 Gettleman, supra note 49, at A6 (“Every day at noon women were driving to the front lines to bring
these guys food.”) (quoting the late Ali Iman Sharmarke, a Mogadishu-based journalist).
163 Id. (“The Islamists say the sooner [elections are held] the better. They know they are the most popular
force in the country.”).
164 LEWIS, supra note 21, at 13, 63–64.
165 See Menkhaus, supra note 45, at 116.
166 See id. at 112–13 (discussing areas controlled by al-Ittihad).
159
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Public recognition of these principles is part of the right of Muslims to selfdetermination.167 Derived from an ancient tradition that has addressed matters
of public concern for centuries, these principles can contribute to public policy
debates.168 Islamic principles may not directly translate into modern law, but
states can creatively adapt them even while honoring democratic
constitutionalism, human rights, and the rule of law.169 As explained earlier in
this Comment, the SNM in Somaliland, the UIC in Mogadishu, and other
Somali Islamists already have experience with creatively adapting religious
principles to local conditions. As citizens and political leaders, they will
continue this work.
Islamists in other countries already know how to participate in democracy.
Turkey is a prime example. Islamists there have led the government for much
of the past decade, often proving willing to strengthen democracy and
collaborate with non-Islamists in making political agendas.170 Pakistan—
which, like Somalia, faces a significant threat from extremist Islamists171—has
also managed to accommodate Islamists without surrendering to theocracy: Its
Shari′a court system allows Islamists and non-Islamist Muslims to peacefully
debate law and religion.172 Closer to Somalia, Tunisian Islamists continued to
participate in coalitions with secular parties even as crises unfolded in the
wake of the Arab Spring.173

167

NEGOTIATING, supra note 120, at 28.
See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Islamic Law (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author) (describing substantive aspects of Shari a and law in Muslim-majority societies, with commentary on
integrating it into modern state law) [hereinafter ISLAMIC LAW].
169 NEGOTIATING, supra note 120, at 85.
170 See Mustafa Akyol, Turkey May Find Itself With ‘AKP Constitution’, AL-MONITOR (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/turkey-akp-constitution-erdogan-referendum.html
(describing attempts by Islamists to bolster democracy in Turkey following the 2011 elections: “Instead of
going solo . . . [the governing Islamist party] joined a parliamentary ‘constitutional commission’ along with
deputies from three other major [non-Islamist] parties’” and negotiated with them.); Turkey’s Erdogan
Announces Kurdish Reforms, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe24330722. In 2013, Turkey’s Islamist Prime Minister announced a reform package strengthening rights for
ethnic, religious, and political minorities. Id.
171 See Yusufzai, supra note 18.
172 See ISLAMIC LAW, supra note 168, at 171–72 (discussing debates within Pakistan’s Shari a courts
regarding land reform, capital punishment, and the rights of minority religious communities).
173 Tunisia Unveils New Coalition Government, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/africa/2013/03/2013381546957967.html (announcing a second Islamist-led coalition, backed by two
major secular parties, following the assassination of a leftist politician).
168
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Throughout North Africa, Islamists are experimenting with new roles as the
Arab Spring’s revolts replace secular autocracy with democracy.174 In Somalia,
too, Islamists can share power and contribute to national conversations about
values. Politicians and others ought to view Islamists as partners and legitimate
leaders in forging new law and a new national identity.
C. Islamism Offers a Unifying Identity
Islamism is also an important support for the Somali state because of its
cross-clan appeal.175 For many years, clans were the basis for Somali society—
a truth Barre reinforced by privileging members of clans closely related to his
own.176 He also brutally punished members of clans he identified as opponents,
such that clan identity was “literally a matter of life and death, both for the
individual and the group.”177
Barre used clan identity to classify Somalis according to their degree of
allegiance to his regime, but clan discrimination was prevalent even before he
took power. In the colonial and pre-colonial era, Islamic sheikhs ideally
embodied an overarching religious identity and strove to build peace between
clans.178 For that reason, Somali culture distinguished between two kinds of
people: “men of the spear, and men of God.”179 The first fought for the clan,
whereas the second built peace. These latter men fought an uphill battle. As
one Somali proverb put it, the mentality was “me and my clan against the

world; me and my family against my clan; me and my brother against my
family; me against my brother.”180 Post-colonial governments attempted to

take over the unification work of the sheikhs, dubbing “clannism” a source of
nepotism and inequality.181
174 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslimbrotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Islamist Party Wins Big in Tunisia
Elections, CBS NEWS (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-20124948/islamist-partywins-big-in-tunisia-elections/.
175 There is no ready definition of “clan” in the Somali context—after all, “[o]nly that which has no
history is definable,” and clans have a very long history. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF
MORALS 27–28 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1989). See Hussein M. Adam, Somalia: Militarism, Warlordism or
Democracy?, 54 REV. AFR. POL. EC. 11, 12–19 (1992) [hereinafter Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?],
for a brief history and analysis of the role of clan in Somali society.
176 ELMI, supra note 24, at 34.
177 AN AFRICA WATCH REPORT, supra note 27, at 4 (citation omitted).
178 IOAN M. LEWIS, MAKING AND BREAKING STATES IN AFRICA: THE SOMALI EXPERIENCE 53 (2010).
179 Id.
180 HARPER, supra note 124, at 11 (capitalization altered for prose format).
181 LEWIS, supra note 178, at xvi–xvii.
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The new state need not hew to the anti-clan sentiments of early postcolonialism: It could reimagine clans as one “building block” of personal
identity.182 The provisional constitution is silent on the matter, other than
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of clan.183 Either way, a sense of shared
identity—of belonging to something together with every other citizen—is
essential to the success of any state.
In Somalia, Islam is the likeliest source of this sense. Islamists certainly
believe it is: “Radical clan factions are the continuation of political tribalism,”
Abdullahi writes, contrasting them with the “modern Islamic movement [as] a
new social and political force.”184 One Somali Islamist echoes this argument,
saying, “[t]he best system that can end discrimination . . . against us is Islam.
Nobody can come to me and say I have a monopoly over the Islamic identity,
but one can say you are not clan X because your lineage does not conform to
that clan’s lineage system.”185 Not all Islamists view clans so negatively—
some reject clans altogether in favor of an overarching national religious
identity, while others believe that clan identity and Somali Islam are
inseparable186—but all believe it should at least serve as an identity that
transcends the clan.
Whether or not Islamism is the panacea against social fragmentation that its
proponents make it out to be,187 no other identity comes close to having its
broad appeal. Somali nationalism, the basis for the first post-colonial state,188

182 See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice,
90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (1996), for a revisionist critique of earlier narratives unqualifiedly criticizing clan
identity (“[F]or some persons, self-identification is best achieved by loyalty to a nation, tribe or ethnie. . . .
What is new [in scholarship] is a growing consciousness of a personal right to compose one’s identity. This
explanation sees current developments neither exclusively in terms of the inexorable emergence of global and
regional regimes nor in terms of a nationalist determinism. Rather, it posits the emergence of a world in which
each individual will freely choose a personal identity constructed out of a broad array of building
blocks . . . .”).
183 DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, art. 11(1).
184 Recovering, supra note 35, at 204.
185 ELMI, supra note 24, at 40.
186 Id. at 46.
187 See, e.g., Mohamed A. Hussein, Why Somali People in London Protested Against President Hassan
Sheikh Mohamud?, HORSEED MEDIA (May 12, 2013), http://horseedmedia.net/2013/05/12/why-somali-peoplein-london-protested-against-president-hassan-sheikh-mohamud/ (accusing the new Islamist President Hassan
“of turning the capital city into clan enclave [sic] where the president, the governor and mayor and everyone
else who has position worth mentioning [sic] are from the same clan as president [sic].”).
188 See generally TOUVAL, supra note 87, for a discussion of early Somali nationalism.
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has not been a major factor in Somali identity for decades.189 Liberal
democracy alone is unlikely to serve as a foundational identity because many
Somalis believe it only offers abstract notions of citizenship and material
benefits, but not spiritual identity.190 The Somali state would do better to
accept Islamic identity than to revive nationalism or offer liberal citizenship
alone, even if it must reconcile Islamism with democratic norms and human
rights.191 Islamists have earned enough legitimacy in the eyes of citizens to
help define the national consciousness, and their role in the state will let them
do so.
IV. THE NEW STATE OFFERS ISLAMISTS BENEFITS
Islamists have many contributions to offer the new state, but political
collaboration is a two-way street: What benefits does the state offer them in
return? This question takes on great significance for those pragmatic Islamists
for whom support for democracy is a matter of expediency and not principle.
But the question is no cause for alarm: Participating in the new state promises
rewards for pragmatic Islamists because it will allow them to avoid the
hostility extremists face, help shape Somalia’s law, and build the country’s
future without losing the legitimacy they have earned.
A. The New Constitution Allows Islamists to Help Shape the Law
Law should reflect the ideals and norms of the people it seeks to govern,
and the Somali Constitution will allow Shari′a as understood by Somali
Islamists to influence how courts and politicians interpret laws and human
rights.192 Islamists should both accept and participate in the new State’s
framework of letting deliberative democracy decide the precise contours of law
and interpretations of Shari′a. They should do this for two reasons: (1) so that
Islamists have incentives to carry out scholarship, adaptation, and public
persuasion on behalf of their particular agendas; and (2) so that one generation
of Somalis does not unduly bind future ones to its interpretations of religion.
189 ELMI, supra note 24, at 47 (“Between the two overarching identities in Somalia, nation (Somali
identity) and Islam (religious identity), Islamic identity has the better chance, at least at present, of functioning
as an inclusive identity in identity reconstruction, as various groups have been promoting Islamic identity for a
long time.”).
190 Id. at 45–46.
191 See generally NEGOTIATING, supra note 120, and discussion infra Parts IV.A–B, for reflections on how
Islamic identity can infuse, and be infused with, democracy and human rights.
192 See DASTUURKA JAMHUURIYADDA FEDERAALKA SOOMAALIYA [PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA], Aug. 1, 2012, arts. 2(3), 40–41.
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SNM’s state-building in Somaliland and al-Islah’s electoral successes in
the 2012 elections show that many Islamists are willing to accept democracy.
Democracy will give them a role in crafting public law, thus protect them from
being oppressed by other Islamists who interpret Shari′a differently.193 In
addition, accepting the ground rules of democracy will keep many Islamists
from being considered extremists by the State, its foreign supporters, and the
Somali public. Their acceptance of democracy will also allow Islamists to
avoid the military targeting,194 international sanctions,195 and widespread
suspicion196 that follow al-Shabaab. Recent successes of the government and
international forces in pressuring extremists make peaceful political
participation a fruitful option for those Islamists who are not committed
opponents of democracy.
Although many Islamists will be wary of the State’s inclusion of human
rights as a source of law alongside Shari′a,197 they can reconcile themselves to
this dual-values regime. Some already have, including al-Islah beginning in the
Barre era198 and, allegedly, even some former members of radical groups.199
Others are unlikely to reject the regime outright, given that their interest in
order and public respect outweighs any desire to implement a pre-made
agenda. Undecided pragmatists can look to history for a justification of human
rights: in their absence, the Barre regime trampled on the Islamists. Given their
history, it would be ironic for Somali Islamists to advocate tyranny of the kind
Barre used. Rights compatible with the public aspects of religion sketched out
above would prevent Islamists from suffering repression, discrimination, and
public suspicion in the ways they once did. Robust protection of human rights
would allow Islamists to maintain freedom from interference by the new state
and foreign governments and their hard-earned popular legitimacy. Islamists

193

See Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 212 (noting different opinions among Somali Islamists).
See Verini, supra note 101 (al-Shabaab defeated in Kismayo by Kenyan and African Union forces);
see also, supra Odeke note 101 (defections from al-Shabaab to international pro-government forces).
195 See Exec. Order, supra note 94 (designating al-Ittihad’s leader a terrorist).
196 See HUSSEIN, supra note 107 (expressing concern over growing faction of extremist sympathizers in
Somaliland’s government).
197 See, e.g., ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1996) (“The negative constitutional and human rights consequences of
Shari’a appear to be entrenched by the assumed religious authority and inviolability of Shari’a. I believe that it
is imperative to challenge and modify this assumption . . .”) [hereinafter REFORMATION].
198 See Abdullahi Dissertation, supra note 16, at 260.
199 See Adam, supra note 26, at 219 (“Supporters of [al-Ittihad] claim that . . . [t]hey intend to respect the
rights of non-Muslims . . . .”).
194
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can reconcile themselves to this element of the new State and lead in a way
that demonstrates faith to constitutional values.
B. Participating in the New State Will Allow Islamists to Maintain Their
Legitimacy
If pragmatic Islamists join extremists instead and insist on subjecting the
Somali state to their interpretation of Islam, or controlling the state exclusively,
they will face a future of hypocrisy and violence. Political conformity would
become the benchmark for religious orthodoxy, and respect for certain political
leaders would be equated with piety before God.200 Although the idea of
secular statehood as the modern West understands it is not suitable for
Somalia, the position and moral legitimacy of Islamists would be compromised
if they attempted to install a theocracy of the sort advocated by al-Shabaab.
Somalis have spent the past twenty years looking for peace and have longed
for the orderly government since at least the colonial era. They would not
likely look upon launching the country into yet another existential struggle to
“Islamize” it any more approvingly than they did the hyper-moralism that
defined Islamists’ early efforts to enforce sexual norms in Mogadishu back in
1991.201
Beyond the practical outcomes of attempts to install theocracy, there are
theoretical reasons for Somali Islamists to favor peaceful democratic politics.
If they succeed in establishing theocracy, the Islamists will put themselves in
the untenable position of claiming religious sanction without selfrighteousness. Islam considers it a contradiction for anyone to lay claim to
piety: Historically, political leaders established their Islamic bona fides by
respecting the autonomy of religious scholars, who in turn would show that
they were loyal to God above all else by asserting their independence from
civil rulers.202 Neither the state nor Islam will have authority from mutual
support, recognition, and tension if they collapse into each other. And Islamists
will lose the support they gain from operating effective, relatively apolitical
social-service networks.
In addition, power corrupts. Making religious orthodoxy and piety the
criteria for promotion within government, rather than political vision and
expertise, will result in hypocrisy, corruption, and incompetence in both the
200
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State and Islamic institutions.203 The Somali Islamist movement suffered
terribly at the hands of a tyrant who reveled in religious hypocrisy: recreating
that experience for others is the last thing it should seek. Islamism became a
potent force in Somalia precisely because it was an alternative to the Barre
regime. It would be both tragic and self-defeating for Somali Islamists to
become oppressors in the name of religion.
Fortunately, many Islamists already realize this and indicate that they want
a democratic Somalia. They are reaping the rewards, through both electoral
victory and rapprochement with important foreign powers, including the
United States, Ethiopia, and Kenya.204 Their uncommitted comrades should
join them in doing so, and observers suspicious of Islamists should recognize
that political pluralism can hold its own appeal for pragmatic as well as
principled Islamist democrats.
V. ISLAMISTS MUST MAKE POLICY DECISIONS
The conditions are ripe for Islamists to lead the Somali State. Many
Islamists are either democrats or pragmatists, and non-extremist Islamists and
the State have plenty to offer each other. The new constitution, in particular,
provides opportunities for Islamists to contribute to the development of laws
and institutions. But conditions and constitutions alone are not enough without
a governing agenda. For that to happen, Islamists must decide how they will
approach three issues: (1) state policy; (2) clan identity in Somali society; and
(3) their own community commitments.
A. Islamists Must Decide How the New State Should Consolidate and
Exercise Power
Islamists have not yet developed systematic policy platforms. They do not
have clearly-articulated positions on constitutional design, how Shari′a will
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See id. at 292.
See Hillary R. Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks With President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud After Their Meeting (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/
rm/2013/01/202998.htm; Ethiopia Promises Support to Rebuild Somalia, VOICE OF AM. (Nov. 28, 2012),
http://www.voanews.com/content/Somalia-ethiopia-rebuilding/1554572.html (“Ethiopia says it will support
Somalia by re-establishing the country’s institutions and training its defense forces. These promises were made
during the first state visit of Somalia’s newly elected president to Ethiopia.”); Zahra Rashid, Somali President
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Kenya, HIRAAN ONLINE (Dec. 21, 2012), http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2012/
Dec/27405/somali_president_hassan_sheikh_mohamud_in_kenya.aspx (describing a state visit by President
Mohamud to visit Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and his ministers).
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impact and co-exist with public law, and other questions regarding transition,
such as how to engage with warlords or rebuild the economy.205 President
Hassan is new to politics, a former educator and university administrator who
made honest governance the centerpiece of his platform.206 His office will
require him to add more substance to his agenda.
Other Islamists would do well to follow those who have engaged in the
political process by organizing political parties and campaigning on platforms,
entering into dialogue and coalitions with other politicians, and opening
themselves to independent media scrutiny.207 Promisingly, many Islamist
groups already do so. Now, they need to decide what they will propose to their
fellow citizens.
If honored, the new constitution’s promise of democratic deliberation and
respect for both Shari′a and human rights will give Islamists ample opportunity
to help chart the state’s course. Islamists will have the right, as equal citizens,
to influence the laws of their country and apply their experience in
administering them. But that right brings the duty to exercise it intelligently,
which means Islamists must be ready to exercise power and not merely gain it.
A failure to answer practical political questions, like those Somali Islamists
face now, contributed significantly to political unrest in another Muslimmajority country in East Africa: Sudan. There, rival Islamist groups developed
their agendas only after taking control of the country’s governing
institutions.208 Hypocrisy and civil strife ensued.209 To ensure that they did not
205

See ELMI, supra note 24, at 68.
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but perhaps it was also evidence of their commitment to democratic transparency and openness to outside
scrutiny.
208 ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA’IM, AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF ISLAM 137 (2006)
[hereinafter AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM] (“Despite their long history of extensive political rhetoric in favor
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or detailed in public the specific features of the model they hope to install in the Sudan.”).
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come this far in earning power only to squabble with each other over day-today controversies, Somali Islamists have to decide what the new state ought to
do and how they want it to honor their interpretations of Islam.
B. Islamists Must Decide How to Frame Clan Identity
Islamists must also decide how to relate to the other great force in Somali
identity: the clan. Much Islamist rhetoric toward clans is negative, but some of
it is more positive.210 Clan identity is a living force in Somalia and will be for
the foreseeable future, as earlier, popular, failed government attempts at
eliminating it make clear.211 Islamists will need to engage it, critique it, or do
both.212
Other Muslim-majority countries in Africa have reconciled ethnicity,
citizenship, and Islam into new notions of citizenship. In Senegal, for example,
religious scholars have strengthened civil society and mediated between
competing political forces.213 Islamists from those countries have perspectives
that could be seen as helpful and legitimate by Somali Islamists. Islamists will
need to address clan identity if they intend to shape Somali political and
cultural identity and they will need to do so in a way that they believe is
consistent with their religious agenda. They should do so together with
Islamists from other countries and prominent members of various clans so as to
ground the process in dialogue and lessons learned from past experiences.
C. Islamists Must Decide the Future of Their Community Commitments
Islamists have undertaken community commitments ranging from
providing health care and famine relief to mediating peace conferences,
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See supra notes 175–87 and accompanying text.
LEWIS, supra note 178, at 72 (“Previous civilian governments also sought to . . . eradicate tribalism

and other sources of nepotism and injustice. These ambitions and slogans were not new; and dissatisfaction

with the previous civilian leaders centered not so much on their stated aims but on their failure to implement
them. Strong authoritarian rule and charismatic leadership . . . raised the hopes of many by promising a new
and more effective method of tackling old problems. But the most difficult and fundamental of these remained
unresolved.”).
212 This is especially true given the predominance of certain sub-clans within the ranks of Islamist
leadership. See ELMI, supra note 24, at 67; Militarism, Warlordism or Democracy?, supra note 175, at 19 (on
the close relationship between SNM and Issaq clans).
213 AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 208, at 151 (stating that Islamists and traditional religious
authorities “seem to operate as part of a constitutional system of checks and balances” in “tension, cooperation
and mutual dependence” with Senegal’s political leaders).
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training local religious authorities, and operating business ventures. Somali
Islamists must decide what to do with those agendas as the state rises and they
enter politics. They could continue to develop their commitments or abandon
them and try to make state institutions carry on the work. The first option
seems more prudent and realistic for both Islamists and the state.
Islamists have incentives to maintain their community commitments.
Islamist legitimacy does not depend on efforts to govern the country alone:
Somalis have seen enough hypocrisy from idealistic regimes not to place all
their trust in would-be rulers. The most important Islamist efforts of the past
twenty years have been in creating shared identities, establishing law, and
providing social services. Islamists have provided social space that is neither
controlled by the government nor atrophied under the heat of chaos. Islamism
provides hope because it has made law, spread religion, and built community
in Somalia, even under tyranny and during anarchy. These are the
achievements that earn Islamists support. As they move into positions of power
and share in the work of governing Somalia, Islamists should commit
themselves to continuing to develop institutions and society at the local level.
The new State, while establishing a unified legal system, would do well to
recognize that Islamists have helped fill the void left by Barre’s fall. Given
support by, and a role in, the State, Islamists can use their experience to further
the process of national reunification. Non-Islamists would deprive the state of
many experiences, and uproot the routines of many Somali communities, if
they insisted on replacing local Islamist institutions with state ones. All of this
assumes, of course, that the state could actually expand its jurisdiction and
authority quickly enough to administer a service system, at a time when it has
yet to consolidate power over the entirety of Somalia and is still facing major
threats from extremists. Islamists should assess this situation—and their own
political incentives—realistically, and renew their community commitments
even as they begin to seek office and state influence.
CONCLUSION
Islamists have spent the past four decades earning the respect of their
fellow Somalis by resisting tyranny, restoring order, and building
communities. They were rewarded for their efforts with the presidency in
2012. Islamist political victory means that the discourse adopted by many of
Somalia’s transitional leaders and observers will have to change. Extremism is
still very dangerous, but it does not encompass the entirety of Somali
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Islamism. Instead of being seen as a threat to be managed, Islamists should be
seen as partners to be engaged.
Analysis of the benefits that Islamists and the state can offer each other
helps to correct for the antagonism inherent in the framework of antiextremism. It shows that Islamists can offer the state legitimacy in Somali
communities, where Islamists are working for development, identity that
transcends clan divisions, and values by which to orient state policy.
Meanwhile, the state can offer Islamists the ability to help shape law according
to Islamist interpretations of Shari′a without jeopardizing popular support for
Islamists in the way the imposition of theocracy would. Many Somali Islamists
believe in democracy and human rights for those reasons; others who are less
committal right now will still find plenty in political pluralism that they can
come to accept.
Islamists have not yet made all the decisions they will need to help govern
democratic Somalia. Some never will, choosing instead to resist the new state
with arms and terror. But with the election of President Hassan as the state’s
leader at the start of its next era, it is time to recognize the skills, knowledge,
experience, and beliefs that Islamists can bring to Somali politics. And justice
respects the right of Islamists as citizens of the new state to contribute
peacefully and constructively to the country’s governing institutions and
communities.
Somali Islamists in the new state can combat extremism, establish the rule
of law, develop communities, and provide an example to the world of what
happens when democratic institutions, religious commitment, and political
pragmatism come together. They can unite men of the spear and men of God
under the banner of a free state.
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